This study documents the cyclical properties of business credit in the U.S. and in the Euro area and constructs a theoretical model that can successfully replicate the observed characteristics. I …nd that real business loans lag output, i.e., business credit is more strongly correlated with past output than with current output. Furthermore, real business loans correlate negatively with future output and investment and positively with past output and investment. I show that a fairly standard model of business and credit ‡uctuations with agency costs can neither generate the lagging behavior of business credit nor can it induce the observed cross-correlation patterns of output, investment, and business loans. I introduce a costly …nancial intermediation mechanism to an otherwise standard macroeconomic framework and show that the evolution of intermediary balance sheets and interaction of intermediation and agency costs can induce the observed regularities.
Introduction
The recent …nancial turmoil and the ensuing recession have spurred a great deal of interest in understanding the role of credit markets in macroeconomic ‡uctuations. Driven by what many view as outright failure of some of the conventional approaches to account for certain key aspects of the recent crisis, a rapidly expanding literature is reevaluating the interaction of …nancial markets with the broader economy (see, e.g., Jermann and Quadrini, 2012 , Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011 , Gilchrist et al., 2009 , Kiyotaki and Moore, 2008 . These studies naturally emphasize various forms of credit market imperfections as well as …nancial sector shocks and investigate their implications in a variety of frameworks. Surprisingly, however, very little has been done to formally evaluate whether the adopted frameworks are consistent with some of the most basic cyclical properties of credit. In this paper, I seek to …ll this gap by addressing two basic questions: What are the cyclical properties of credit? What type of model structure is consistent with these characteristics?
The analysis consists of an empirical and a theoretical component. In the empirical part, I
focus on identifying the cyclical behavior of business loans in the United States and in the Euro area. In the United States, business loans are de…ned as total commercial and industrial credit originated by all commercial banks. In the Euro area, they correspond to monetary and …nancial institutions'loans to non-…nancial corporations. I …nd that, in the United States as well as in the Euro area, the cyclical dynamics of business loans are characterized by two distinct properties:
1-Business loans lag output, i.e., current loans are more strongly correlated with past output than current output. 2-Current business loans are positively correlated with past output and investment but negatively correlated with future output and investment. These co-movement patterns are found to be robust under alternative …ltering methods and frequency bands.
In the theoretical part, I construct a dynamic-stochastic model that can replicate these …ndings. I argue that the observed cross-correlation pattern can be interpreted as having been driven by boom-bust cycles in output, investment, and loans. I propose a structure that produces an initial boom and a subsequent collapse in output and investment in conjunction with a gradual expansion of business credit in response to a positive productivity shock. The gradual increase in business loans implies a stronger correlation between current output and future loans than between current output and current loans, which is consistent with the lagging behavior of business credit. Furthermore, the gradual expansion of loans and the future collapse in output and investment, taken together, are consistent with a negative correlation between current loans and future output and investment. The theoretical framework is designed so as to induce these response properties in the face of a productivity shock.
I study an economy in which producers must rely heavily on external …nance to cover operational costs. Financial intermediaries provide working capital loans to producers in a market characterized by agency problems and costly …nancial monitoring. Agency costs play a crucial role in driving the observed cross-correlation pattern. The model also features price stickiness in the …nal goods sector and an interest rate feedback rule speci…cation, which control for the role of monetary policy as emphasized in Christiano et al. (2008a Christiano et al. ( , 2007 . 1 However, the key element in the model that drives the observed cross-correlation pro…le has to do with the way in which business loans are originated by …nancial intermediaries. I introduce a setting where …nancial intermediaries use external as well as internal funds to originate business loans. Internal funds correspond to intermediaries'own net worth (i.e., equity capital) while external funds consist of household deposits and funds raised in the interbank market. In the model, the intermediary can costlessly transform its internal funds into business loans. However, real resources must be used up in the process of raising and managing external funds, which makes it costly to produce loans using externally raised funds. I show that the interaction of intermediation and agency costs can transform what would otherwise be an ordinary shock to labor productivity into a major boom-bust episode and yield the observed cross-correlation properties.
The mechanism that induces the boom-bust cycle and the lagging behavior of business loans works as follows: In the model, intermediaries' internal funds (net worth) are predetermined at the start of each period, thus, cannot be adjusted in response to shocks upon impact. As a result, in response to a positive productivity shock, intermediaries accommodate the increase in loan demand by raising more external funds. Since increased reliance on external funds raises the marginal cost of loan production, producers limit the increase in their loan demand to avoid a sharp increase in the risk premium they face. This constrains the initial expansion of credit in equilibrium relative to a costless-intermediation economy. However, as intermediary net worth accumulates over time, reliance on externally raised funds declines, which gradually reduces the marginal cost of loan production. This results in a hump-shaped response pro…le for loans and induces the lagging behavior of business credit. The initial weakness of the increase in loan demand coupled with the sharp expansion of supply leads to a steep fall in the risk premium producers face. This brings about a substantial increase in output and investment beyond the levels that would obtain in the absence of intermediation costs. However, as business loans build up gradually and supply of loans start to decline in tandem with …rms'productivity, the interest rate faced by producers and the aggregate bankruptcy rate start to rise and eventually exceed their pre-shock levels. As business bankruptcies become more frequent, resources destroyed during …nancial monitoring become more substantial. This exacerbates the contraction in output and leads to the bust phase of the cycle.
The literature on credit markets pioneered by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) has primarily studied the implications of …nancial frictions on the real (non…nancial) sector. In these studies, model dynamics are driven by a minimal set of reduced-form shocks that are consistent with microeconomic evidence and agency costs play the key role in ampli…cation and propagation of real shocks. In part as a reaction to this exclusive focus on the real sector, recent studies by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) The previous literature on …nancial frictions has mainly focused on replicating the contemporaneous correlations between …nancial and real variables. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the previously overlooked co-movement characteristics of business credit, output, and investment at leads and lags. To the best of my knowledge, this is the …rst study to explicitly document and theoretically address the lead/lag patterns of the cross-correlations between business credit and measures of real economic activity. I highlight the lagging behavior of business credit and document the sign-switch in cross-correlations from positive to negative as we move from past to future correlations. Then, I show that a fairly standard model of credit and business ‡uctuations that relies entirely upon the agency cost mechanism cannot generate the observed correlation structure. Yet, I also …nd that one need not revert to several arbitrary reduced-form shock speci…cations to account for the key empirical …ndings. The observed correlation patterns as well as the lagging behavior of business loans can be simultaneously induced when …nancial intermediation frictions are incorporated into the model alongside agency costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the empirical regularities explained in the theoretical part. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and discusses the mechanisms that deliver the correlation and lead-lag patterns observed in data.
Section 4 lays out the estimation strategy and discusses the properties of the estimated model with particular emphasis on intermediation and agency costs. Section 5 summarizes the results and suggests potential directions for future research.
Empirical Analysis
This section explores the cross-correlation characteristics of real business loans, output, and investment in the United States and in Euro area.
Static Correlations
I start the analysis by computing a series of correlations between real business loans, output (real GDP), and real investment using the United States and Euro area data. Business loans in the United States are de…ned as all commercial and industrial loans originated by all commercial banks. 2 In the Euro area, business loans correspond to monetary and …nancial institutions' (MFIs) loans to non-…nancial corporations in the Euro zone. 3 For both economies, business loans are de…ned in levels. I use seasonally-adjusted quarterly data and focus on the co-movement patterns of the cyclical components of each series, which are recovered using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter. I also report the results obtained using a 1 st di¤erence …lter. Note that, while contemporaneous correlations can provide valuable descriptive statistics, an analysis based entirely on this measure is likely to miss important dynamic interactions. To investigate some of these dynamic aspects, I also compute the correlations between current business loans and a certain number of leads and lags of the real GDP and investment.
As can be seen in Table 1 , contemporaneous correlations suggest a procyclical stance for real business loans in the United States. It is observed that, while past output is positively correlated with current loans, the correlations between future output and current loans are negative. In addition, the contemporaneous correlation between current loans and current output is weaker than those between current loans and lagged output. A similar cross-correlation pattern is revealed for real business loans and investment. Current loans are more strongly correlated with past investment than with current investment. The estimated correlation coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant and the same pattern is observed when the 1 st di¤erence …lter is used. Table 2 displays the estimates for the Euro area. We observe a similar cross-correlation and lead/lag structure for the Euro zone. Contemporaneous loans are more strongly correlated with past output and investment than with current output and investment. Furthermore, the positive correlations between current loans and past output and investment become negative for future output and investment.
As will be discussed later in detail, the theoretical model adopted to interpret the observed patterns features one-period loan contracts. The results reported in Table 1 and Table 2 , however, are computed using loans data that is aggregated across varying maturity types. To assess the sensitivity of the results and to facilitate better comparison with the theoretical model, I
next evaluate the correlation patterns for short-term loans in the U.S. and in the Euro area. Table 3 reports the results obtained using the short-term loans data. 4 It is observed that short-term loans exhibit similar co-movement characteristics with aggregated loans. In the United States as well as in the Euro area, short-term loans are found to lag output. Furthermore, positive correlations between current short-term loans and past output and investment turn negative for current short-term loans and future output and investment.
Dynamic Correlations
In order to assess the robustness of these results, following Croux et al. (2001) , I next compute dynamic correlations. This measure provides a richer characterization of co-movement patterns and dynamic interactions by describing how variables correlate at di¤erent frequency bands.
Since we are primarily concerned with identifying the cyclical behavior of business credit, dynamic correlations prove particularly useful as they allow us to assess co-movement speci…cally at business cycle frequencies.
Let (W ) denote the dynamic correlation between two covariance-stationary processes x t and y t at the frequency band W 2 [ ; ]: Croux et al. (2001) show that (W ) corresponds to the static correlation between x t and y t after an appropriate band-pass …lter (one that isolates the cycles with frequencies that fall into the band W ) is applied to both x t and y t . Therefore, as explained in Appendix I in detail, the dynamic correlation at the band W is given by
where Z W (L) is a two-sided lag polynomial representing in the time-domain the band-pass …lter designed to eliminate the cycles with frequencies outside of W .
Next, I employ the approximate band-pass …ltering methods developed by Baxter and King (1999) to compute dynamic correlations of real business loans, output, and investment. Bandpass …lters isolate the periodic components with frequencies within a speci…ed band. Tables   4 and 5 exhibit the dynamic correlations for aggregate and short-term real loans, respectively.
Correlations are calculated for 4 quarters of leads and lags of output and investment using the U.S. and the Euro area data. 5 To evaluate the co-movement patterns at di¤erent frequency bands, two alternative band-pass …lters are considered: The …rst one (BP 6 32 ) isolates the business cycle frequencies, i.e., cycles with periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters. The second one (BP 24 64 ) picks lower frequency cycles with periodicities between 24 and 64 quarters. 6 It is 4 Figures in Table 3 are computed using HP-…ltered data. In this exercise, the U.S. and the Euro area datasets respectively run from 1997:2 to 2012:1 and from 1997:3-2011:4. 5 In this exercise, aggregate loans data runs from 1974:1 to 2010:1 for the United States. 6 To calculate the cross-correlations with aggregate loans, I use an approximate band-pass …lter with a movingaverage representation that includes 12 leads and lags, which is motivated by the …ndings of Baxter and King (1999) . To calculate the cross-correlations with short-term loans, I use a …lter with 6 leads and lags in the moving average representation. This serves to limit the number of observations dropped from the short-term found that, in both frequency bands and for aggregate as well as short-term loans, dynamic crosscorrelations share the previously highlighted common pattern: While current business loans are positively correlated with past and current output and investment, they correlate negatively with future output and investment. Furthermore, business loans correlate more strongly with past output and investment than with current output and investment. These …ndings characterize both the U.S. and the Euro area data and are in line with the results obtained earlier by using 1 st di¤erence and HP …lters.
Level vs. Flow
Correlation statistics presented thus far have been calculated using level data, i.e., aggregate real loans are measured as outstanding amounts in each period. The correlation results obtained using level data are consistent with the …ndings of Covas and den Haan (2011). Using yearly …rm-level data, Covas and den Haan (2011) …nd that …rms'debt issuance is procyclical in the United States. They also …nd that current debt is more strongly correlated with past output (de…ned as the gross real product of the corporate sector) than with current output and is negatively correlated with next year's output.
In addition to the level approach, Covas and den Haan (2011) also consider de…ning debt as a ‡ow variable. The ‡ow of debt in a particular period is measured as the change in the level of debt during that period. Along similar lines, I next reevaluate the correlation patterns using ‡ow data. Table 6 shows that, when measured as a ‡ow variable, business loans cease to exhibit the previously emphasized lagging behavior. 7 Furthermore, the cross-correlation patterns (particularly the sign-switch from positive to negative) that characterize the level data also disappear. These results are again consistent with the …ndings of Covas and den Haan (2011) for the ‡ow case. In the following theoretical analysis, we shall study the cyclical behavior of loan levels rather than ‡ows. For this reason, in the calibration exercise, we shall seek to replicate the correlation statistics obtained using the level data.
Model
Having identi…ed the cross-correlation properties of output, investment and business loans, I next proceed to construct a theoretical model that can replicate the observed patterns. The adopted framework builds on the basic structure laid out in Demirel (2009) . The model economy is inhabited by …ve types of agents: Households, producers, retailers, …nancial intermediaries, and a government.
loans series, which is only about half as long as the aggregate loans series. 7 In the ‡ow exercise, aggregate loan data is used for both the U.S. and the Euro area. Flow of short-term loans exhibit similar cross-correlation and lead/lag patterns. Output and investment data are HP-…ltered.
Households
Households are in…nitely lived, identical and have time-separable preferences that depend on consumption of a private composite good and work e¤ort. Households seek to maximize
where 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, > 1 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; > 0 is the inverse of labor supply elasticity; the variable C t denotes consumption and L t stands for work e¤ort. The consumption good is speci…ed as a CES aggregate of a continuum of di¤erentiated products indexed by i 2 [0; 1]: More speci…cally,
where C(i) t is the consumption of the i th product and denotes the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated products. This speci…cation implies that the aggregate price index is
where P (i) t denotes the price level for the i th di¤erentiated product. Note that the aggregate price index de…nes the minimum expenditure needed to assemble one unit of the composite consumption index. Furthermore, the CES speci…cation implies that the optimal allocation of expenditures among di¤erentiated products is governed by the rule
Households start each period with money and capital holdings of M t 1 and K t 1 : They provide capital and labor services to producers and make deposits at the …nancial intermediary.
Expenditures on consumption and investment goods require cash. At the start of each period, the representative household receives wage and capital income in cash and makes consumption, investment and deposit (B H t ) decisions. At the end of the period, households receive dividend payments from the …nancial intermediary, producer and retailer …rms as well as principal plus interest on their deposits. The household also pays lump-sum taxes (T t ) in cash (or receives transfers) at the end of each period. Then, the relevant constraints for the household problem can be constructed as
where I t = K t (1 )K t 1 , the variables W t and R t denote the nominal wage and capital rental rates, R f t stands for the gross nominal risk-free interest rate,
t respectively denote the dividends distributed by retailers, producers and …nancial intermediaries in nominal terms. Equation (2) is the the sequential budget constraint and (3) describes the cash-in-advance constraint which states that consumption and investment expenditures cannot exceed nominal balances at the start of the period net of bank deposits. The household chooses the sequences fC t ; I t ; L t ; B H t ; M t g 1 t=s to maximize (1) subject to (2)- (4) given fW t ; R t ; P t ; R f t ; T t ; t g 1 t=s and the initial values M s 1 ; K s 1 > 0: Household optimization yields
Expressions (5) and (6) are the familiar intertemporal substitution equations associated with the optimal deposit and capital accumulation decisions and (7) is the standard labor supply equation. In addition, the cash-in-advance constraint must bind, as suggested by (8), in an equilibrium with a positive net nominal interest rate.
Producers
The economy is inhabited by a large number of manufacturing …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1].
Producers hire labor and capital services from competitive factor markets and use a CobbDouglas production technology to produce homogenous goods. Manufactured products are then used by retailer …rms as intermediate inputs to produce a …nal retail good.
Manufacturing …rms are subject to idiosyncratic as well as aggregate uncertainty. Speci…cally, the amount of intermediate goods produced by producer j in period t (Y (j) m;t ) is given by
with
where K(j) t 1 denotes the amount of capital used by producer j, the constant K > 0 is a …xed factor of production that substitutes private capital services and is available to all producers in a similar fashion. The …xed factor K can be thought to represent unpaid public services or infrastructure that support private production activities. The variable N (j) t denotes the amount of labor hired by producer j and Z t is a labor-augmenting productivity parameter, which follows the process log Z t = z log Z t 1 + " z;t where " z;t N (0; 2 z ) and z 2 [0; 1). The variable A(j) t is a …rm-speci…c total factor productivity parameter distributed independently over time and across producers. This parameter is the source of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the model. For analytical simplicity, it is assumed that A(j) t is distributed uniformly on the support [A; A] with A > A 0 for all j and t:
Due to a friction in the mechanism that governs the transfer of funds from …rms to the household, producers are required to pay for a certain fraction of their operational costs in advance. Each producer borrows the funds it needs to …nance operational costs from …nancial intermediaries. As in Demirel (2009) and Cooley and Nam (1998) , the amount of credit needed by producer j is given by
where > 0 is the fraction of the costs that is required to be paid in advance. Given the production technology described by (9) and (10), the optimal factor demand decisions must
Capital and labor demand functions expressed in (12) imply that a …rm who borrows the amount
where
The right-hand-side of (14) is obtained by incorporating the factor demand equations (12) into the production function (9).
Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediaries fund business projects by providing working capital loans to producers.
To create these loans, the intermediary uses external as well as internal funds. External funds consist of household deposits and funds raised in an interbank market. Internal funds correspond to the intermediary's own net worth (i.e., equity capital). At the end of each period, external funds are repaid using the proceeds of the business loans.
In the interbank market, …nancial intermediaries trade one-period government bonds with the central bank. The central bank sets the return on the government bond (i.e., the risk-free interest rate R f t ) by conducting open market operations in the interbank market. Note that since, in equilibrium, the interest rate on the funds an intermediary can raise in the interbank market should be equal to the interest rate on the funds raised from households, the deposit rate households face must be equal to the risk-free interest rate R f t .
Loan Origination and Intermediary Net Worth
The …nancial intermediary enters period t with net worth of X t 1 and, at the start of the period, accepts deposits from households. In each period, the intermediary pours its entire net worth and external funds into business loans. The amount the intermediary lends to producers (denoted D t ) is then given by
where, B t = B H t +B G t denotes the external funds, which includes the amount households deposit into the intermediary (previously referred to as B H t ) as well as the funds raised in the interbank market (denoted B G t ). Equation (15) describes the intermediary's balance sheet. Note that X t 1 and B t can be thought to represent the intermediary's equity capital and debt, respectively.
A key feature of the model is the presence of …nancial intermediation costs. In the loan production process, the intermediary can costlessly transform its internal funds into business loans. However, to convert externally raised funds into loans, the intermediary must use up real resources. These resources are consumed in the process of collecting and managing these funds.
There are two types of intermediation costs in the model. The …rst type is a …xed time cost. It is assumed that each intermediary is endowed with a …xed amount of labor time denoted L I > 0:
In order to originate loans, an intermediary must dedicate all of its time to the process of loan production. The second type is a variable intermediation cost. As in Curdia and Woodford (2009), variable costs are described by a function G(b t ) > 0 that satis…es the properties
where b t = B t =P t . 8 As mentioned in Curdia and Woodford (2009), a strictly convex intermediation cost function may arise due to a capacity constraint or scarcity of managerial resources. In this paper, I do not seek to explicitly model the exact source of variable intermediation costs.
Instead, I evaluate its implications and show that it can help to understand the previously discussed empirical …ndings. Also note that, due to the convexity of (16), the marginal cost of loan production increases in the volume of loans originated but decreases in the intermediary's net worth. As shall be discussed later in detail, this property (together with the time evolution of intermediary net worth) plays an important role in driving the co-movement patterns discussed in the empirical section. 8 Financial intermediation costs are de…ned in terms of …nal (retail) goods.
The Loan Contract
The loan contract between the typical intermediary and the producer is characterized by an asymmetric information structure in which producers have private information about their idiosyncratic productivity, however, …nancial intermediaries can access that information only at a cost. At the start of each period, ex ante identical producers submit loan applications to acquire working capital. If a loan application is accepted, the requested amount is provided to the producer at the lending rate determined in the contract. After the loan transaction, idiosyncratic uncertainty resolves and production takes place. At the end of the period, a producer may choose to default on its loan in which case all of its manufacturing revenue is con…scated by the The default decision of the producer is characterized by a critical productivity level A(j) t .
If the realization of A(j) t is above this threshold level the producer fully repays the loan and the interest. The producer declares default if otherwise. Since all producers are ex ante identical, their default thresholds, factor and loan demand decisions are similar. Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium involves A(j) t = A t and D(j) t = D t for all j 2 [0; 1]: Dropping the …rm index, the expected producer pro…t can be expressed as
where Q t denotes the price of the intermediate product and R l t denotes the gross lending rate on the loan. 9 Likewise, the expected revenue of the intermediary can be expressed as
Note that (18) includes loan repayments in the case the producer remains solvent (when A t A t A) as well as con…scated revenue in the case the producer defaults (when A A t A t ), taking into account the loss of output resulting from the attempt to monitor the state of the producer upon a default decision.
An intermediary approves a credit application as long as the loan contract promises to deliver an expected return that is greater than or equal the loan's total opportunity cost. Note that, at the start of each period, an intermediary has the option of investing its entire net worth in government bonds. Also, in the process of loan origination, the intermediary must incur the …xed time cost and variable costs de…ned by (16) . Therefore, by agreeing to originate the requested business loan, the intermediary e¤ectively gives up the interest income its designated net worth can yield in the interbank market as well as the wage income its time endowment can earn in the labor market. In addition, the variable cost of transforming external funds into loanable funds must also be covered. Therefore, the following condition must be satis…ed for a loan application to be approved:
As discussed above, the left-hand side of (19) is the expected revenue of the intermediary from a loan operation. The right-hand side of (19) corresponds to the total opportunity cost of a loan. It includes the cost of external funds, the interest foregone on the designated internal funds as well as the value of the real resources (including labor time) that must be used up in the origination process.
The threshold value, A t ; is the productivity level at which the producer is indi¤erent between declaring default and repaying the loan and the interest. That is,
Incorporating this de…nition into (17) and (19) , the producer problem can be compactly rewritten
Note that the optimal demand for business loans described by the solution of (20) immediately translates into labor and capital demand decisions through (12) . Given (14) , the …rst-order optimality conditions can be expressed as
Expression (21) describes the producer's loan demand. The left-hand side of (21) marginal cost of working capital loans. Note that equilibrium cost of borrowing also includes a default-risk premium embedded in the expression (A t ) in addition to the risk-free interest rate R f t . Equation (22) describes the supply of risky producer loans. According to (22) , the producer is able to borrow until the participation constraint of the intermediary binds. Equations (21) and (22) jointly determine the equilibrium default rate and loan volume.
For future reference note that, given (13) , aggregate output in the manufacturing sector can
where the set t corresponds to the group of producers that choose to default in period t. That is,
In a symmetric equilibrium, (24) reduces to
Note that the function (A t ; ) is inversely related to the fraction of output that is destroyed during …nancial monitoring. In this sense, it captures the physical impact of agency costs in the model. In a version of the model economy in which agency issues do not result in any loss of output, we would have (A t ; ) = E[A t ] = (A + A)=2: 11 The implications of agency costs in the model will later be assessed by comparing the case (A t ; ) = (A + A)=2 with the full model speci…cation, which involves (25) with > 0.
Evolution of Intermediary Net Worth
Time evolution of intermediary net worth plays a central role in the model by generating a crucial propagation mechanism. In order to determine the evolution of X t , however, one also needs a characterization for the intermediary's dividend policy. To this end, the intermediary is assumed to maximize the discounted sum of present and future dividend payments to households. The objective function of the intermediary is then given by 
The variable t;s represents the stochastic discount factor with which the intermediary values future random payouts and, as noted earlier, I t denotes dividend payments to households. 12 Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), it is assumed that the intermediary faces a quadratic payout cost of the form
where ! 0; and can be thought of as a long-term target value for the ratio of dividends to net worth. 13 This speci…cation serves to pin down the equilibrium dividend payments in the model, which is needed to fully determine the evolution of the intermediary net worth. But perhaps more importantly, the payout costs result in dividend smoothing in equilibrium, which falls in line with empirical observations as discussed in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
Given a sequence for I t , intermediary net worth evolves according to the rule
The random variable ' t represents a liquidity shock. It follows the process ' t = ' ' t 1 + " ';t
where " ';t N (0; 2 ' ) and ' 2 [0; 1). Plugging the de…nition B t = D t X t 1 in (28), we …nd
Note that the term
corresponds to the gross return on producer loans. Therefore, the bracketed term in (29) gives the excess return (i.e., the premium above the risk-free rate) on business loans. Observe that a positive excess return on loans results in a growth in intermediaries'equity capital that is beyond the risk-free return.
Given an initial value X s 1 0; the intermediary chooses the sequences f I t ; X t g 1 t=s to maximize (26) subject to (29). Given the de…nition (27), intermediary maximization yields
where I t = I t =P t and x t = X t =P t : Equation (30) describes the intermediary's optimal payout policy and characterizes the corresponding time evolution of its net worth. Left-hand side of 1 2 Intermediaries value future random payouts on the basis of households'subjective discount factor and marginal utility of income. 1 3 Payout costs are de…ned in terms of retail goods.
(30) corresponds to the utility gain resulting form a marginal increase in real dividends in period t reduced by the cost of having to deliver that increment in real dividends. Right-hand side of (30) describes the discounted utility gain from a marginal increase in net worth in period t;
which delays the dividend payment to period t + 1; taking into account the marginal cost of dividend payments at time t + 1 as well as the decrease in the cost of dividend payments in period t resulting from the increment in time t net worth (captured by the inverted term in brackets).
Retailers
The economy is also inhabited by a large number of monopolistically competitive retailer …rms.
Retailers transform manufactured products into di¤erentiated goods using a constant-returnsto-scale technology. Speci…cally, the number of di¤erentiated goods produced by the i th retailer is given by
where Y (i) m;t denotes the amount of manufactured inputs used by the retailer i and X > 0 is a productivity parameter. Each …rm sets the price level for its di¤erentiated product to maximize expected present and future discounted pro…ts. Following Rotemberg (1982) , …rms are assumed to face quadratic price adjustment costs given in real terms by 2 where
and M C t = Q t =X: The stochastic discount factor t;s is as de…ned above. In a symmetric equilibrium, each retailer follows the same optimal pricing rule, which is described by the …rst-
where e t = t ( t 1) :
Government
The government collects taxes from households and conducts monetary policy by setting the return on the one-period bond that is traded in the interbank market. I follow Christiano et al.
(2007) in assuming that monetary policy follows a Taylor-type feedback rule of the form
where Y > 0 denotes the non-stochastic steady-state value of output, r 2 [0; 1); and ; y > 0.
The monetary authority participates in the interbank market to ensure that the risk-free interest rate follows (33). The resulting central bank pro…ts or losses are transferred to the consolidated government budget. Then, the government budget constraint can be constructed as
where, as discussed earlier, B G t denotes the net bond position of the central bank in the interbank market. The left-hand-side of (34) 
Parameterization
The model parameters can be classi…ed in two groups. In the …rst group, 1 ; lay the parameters that determine the variables'non-stochastic steady-state values. These parameters are identi…ed by targeting some of the long-term averages of the U.S. data. Table 7 summarizes the values assigned to the parameters in 1 and their target statistics. The subjective discount factor, ; is set so that the implied real rate is 2% in the steady-state. The steady-state elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated products, ; and the quarterly depreciation rate, ;are set so that the implied mark-up and annual capital depreciation rates are both 10%: The share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function, ; is set so that labor income share is 65% in the steady-state. As in a typical business cycle calibration, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ; and the labor supply elasticity parameter, ; are respectively set to 2 and 1; both of which are well within reasonable ranges. Following Demirel (2009) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , the monitoring cost parameter, ; is set to 25%: The upper and lower bounds of the uniform distribution, [A; A]; are determined to ensure that E[A t (j)] = 1 and the quarterly delinquency rate on business loans is 3:2% in the steady-state. This value corresponds to the average delinquency rate on business loans originated by U.S. banks in the period 1987:1-2012:1.
As in Adam and Billi (2008) , the price adjustment cost parameter, ; is set so that the slope of the Phillips curve described by the linearized version of (32) The second parameter group, 2 ; contains the remaining …ve structural parameters !; z ; ' ; z ; and ' ; which do not a¤ect the steady-state allocations of the model. Thus, they cannot be identi…ed by targeting the …rst moments of the data. These parameters are estimated using the method of simulated moments, which involves assigning values so as to minimize the distance between the cross-correlations produced by the theoretical model and those estimated from the data. 14 Let T denote the (20 1) target vector that collects the estimated correlations calculated from the band-pass …ltered U.S. data. 15 The target vector includes the correlations between real business loans and four leads and lags of the real GDP as well as those between real loans and four leads and lags of investment. It also includes the contemporaneous correlations between real business loans and output and investment as well as the standard deviations of real GDP and investment. Let M ( 1 ; 2 ) denote the vector of correlations and standard deviations produced by the theoretical model. Then, the estimation problem can be described
where is a (20 20) diagonal weighting matrix containing the variances of the moment estimates along its main diagonal. This weighting matrix ensures that the estimation procedure places less weight on replicating the moments that are less precisely estimated. Table 8 presents the estimated parameter values and corresponding search ranges. Note that, under certain parameter con…gurations, the theoretical model produces equilibrium indeterminacy. To avoid this problem, the search is restricted to a region of the parameter space (denoted ) in which the theoretical model always yields a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Table 9 compares the cross-correlations produced by the model using the parameter values listed in Tables 7 and 8 with those estimated from the U.S. data. Under the adopted parameterization, the model is quite successful in matching the second moments of the data. All simulated moments lie within two standard error bounds of the estimated data moments. Furthermore, the model can successfully account for the two de…ning cross-correlation characteristics identi…ed in the empirical section: 1-Current loans are more strongly correlated with past output and investment than with contemporaneous output and investment. 2-The correlations between current loans and future output and investment are negative, whereas, those between current loans and past output and investment are positive. In addition to these main regularities, the model can also successfully replicate the volatilities of output and investment as can be seen in the last column of Table 9 .
Correlations
I next carry out a series of counterfactual exercises to assess the implications of …nancial intermediation and agency costs in the model. I …rst compute the cross-correlations without variable intermediation costs by setting = 0: Then, I repeat the exercise by eliminating the impact of agency costs from the model, which involves setting (A t ; ) = 1. 16 Figure 1 exhibits the simulated cross-correlations with and without variable intermediation costs. Observe that, without intermediation costs, the model is unable to replicate the negative correlations between current loans and future output, neither can it generate the lagging behavior of loans. Current loans are positively correlated with future output and are less strongly correlated with past output than with contemporaneous output. When the intermediation cost mechanism is in place, the model can account for both regularities. Figure 2 presents the cross-correlations produced by the model with and without agency costs. While the case with agency costs represents the full model speci…cation, the case without agency costs ( (A t ; ) = (A + A)=2 = 1) corresponds to a version of the economy in which business bankruptcies do not lead to any loss of output. It is observed that, in the absence of agency costs, the model can capture the lagging behavior of loans yet it fails to produce negative correlations between current loans and future output. These results, taken together, suggest that one needs both variable intermediation and agency costs in the model in order to generate the sign switch in cross-correlations from positive to negative and at the same time induce lagging behavior in loans.
Impulse Response Functions
To further highlight the implications of costly …nancial intermediation and agency costs, I next compute the impulse responses of the economy to productivity shocks under alternative model speci…cations. Figure 3 exhibits the responses to a 1% positive productivity shock with and without variable intermediation costs. Observe that, in the absence of intermediation costs (when = 0), output, investment, and real business loans increase upon impact and monotonically converge back to their steady-state levels. These impulse response characteristics suggest that, without intermediation costs, the model will be unable to deliver negative correlations between current loans and future output and investment. To achieve this, one needs a mechanism which will push the responses of output and investment to negative territory after a certain number of periods. This is precisely what costly …nancial intermediation achieves in the model by generating a boom-bust cycle in output and investment. As can be seen in Figure 3 , in the presence of intermediation costs (when =baseline value), the initial responses of investment and output are positive and far more pronounced relative to the case = 0: This initial boom, however, is followed by a bust phase in which output and investment responses slip into negative territory after the fourth quarter following the impact. The future collapse in output and investment coupled with the initial positive response of real business loans leads to a negative correlation between current business loans and future output and investment. Also observe that, in the presence of intermediation costs, the model produces a hump-shaped impulse response function for real business loans. As a result, the response of output in the initial period tends to be more strongly correlated with the response of future business loans. This property of impulse response functions drives in the model what we previously referred to as the lagging behavior of loans. Figure 4 demonstrates the responses to a 1% positive productivity shock with and without agency costs. It is observed that, in the absence of agency costs, output and investment responses are muted relative to those that obtain under full model speci…cation. Furthermore, the bust phase is lost. That is, output and investment initially respond positively and then monotonically revert back to the initial levels without ever having to fall below their steady-state values. It appears that in order to generate a boom-bust sequence, which is crucial for explaining the negative correlations between current loans and future output and investment, one needs agency costs as well as intermediation costs in the model. Also, observe that the response of real business loans is hump-shaped regardless of whether agency costs are present or not. These results suggest that, although the boom-bust pattern is created jointly by agency and …nancial intermediation costs in the model, agency costs do not contribute to the emergence of the lagging behavior exhibited by loans in the face of technology shocks.
Understanding the Lagging Behavior of Loans and the Boom-Bust Pattern
To understand how the model can produce a boom-bust cycle in output and investment and generate lagging behavior in business loans at the same time, it will be useful to intuitively evaluate the interactions between …nancial intermediation costs, intermediaries'net worth, and the rest of the economy.
Lagging Behavior of Business Loans
Endogenous time evolution of intermediary net worth and variable intermediation costs play the key role in driving the gradual adjustment pattern and the lagging behavior of business loans in the model. In response to a positive productivity shock, the demand for working capital loans increases. The rise in demand and the corresponding increase in equilibrium business loans, however, fall short of the levels that would obtain in the frictionless counterpart of the economy. This is because …nancial intermediaries'internal funds (nominal net worth) is a predetermined variable and cannot be adjusted upon impact. 17 In consequence, the intermediary must at …rst accommodate the increase in loan demand by raising more external funds. In the presence of variable intermediation costs, increased reliance on externally raised funds leads to a rise in the marginal cost of loan origination. This in turn curbs the initial expansion of business lending in equilibrium as producers seek to avoid a steep hike in the lending rate they face by limiting the initial increase in their demand for working capital loans. 18 However, as the intermediary net worth increases over time, reliance on external funds decreases. This parallels a progressive decline in the marginal cost of loan origination, which results in a gradual expansion of business credit in equilibrium as observed in Figures 3, 4 , and 5. Due to this gradual build up, the impulse response function of business loans peaks later relative to those of output and investment, which induces the lagging behavior of loans in the model.
Boom-Bust Pattern: The Role of Intermediation and Agency Costs
A positive shock to …rms' productivity increases intermediaries' expected return on working capital loans for a given level of default probability and boosts the supply of business credit.
As discussed above, the presence of variable intermediation costs limits the initial expansion of the demand for business loans. The sharp increase in the supply of credit coupled with the limited initial expansion of demand results in a steep fall in the equilibrium price of risky producer loans. As Figure 3 shows, this leads to a sharp decline in the risk premium in excess of what would be realized in a costless-…nancial-intermediation economy. Accordingly, output and investment expand beyond the levels that would obtain in the absence of intermediation costs, which represents the initial boom.
The boom phase is reversed as the volume of working capital loans gradually builds up and the positive productivity shock starts to die out. Along this process, the equilibrium default rate and risk premium start to rise. This is the point where the impact of agency costs becomes palpable as they amplify the reversal process and instigate the bust phase. Due to costly …nancial monitoring, as business bankruptcies rise, more resources are destroyed during the monitoring process. This leads to greater output losses as labor productivity reverts back to the steadystate. As a result, the responses of output and investment eventually turn negative, resulting in a boom-bust pattern. As demonstrated by Figures 3, 4 , and 5, the point at which the risk premium rises above its long-run steady-state level marks the beginning of the bust phase. After this point, output and investment fall below their steady-state levels. The collapse in output and investment realized after the fourth quarter following the impact drive the negative correlations between current loans and future output. Note that since the bust phase never materializes in the absence of agency costs, the correlations between current loans and future output and investment exhibited in Figure 2 never fall into negative territory in the case (A t ; ) = (A + A)=2 = 1.
Boom-Bust Pattern: The Role of Price Rigidity
The degree of price stickiness and the corresponding in ‡ation dynamics also play an important role in the emergence of the boom-bust sequence. In the outlined economy, in ‡ation a¤ects the evolution of intermediaries'real net worth. 19 In the bust phase, the cost-push pressure exerted by increasing risk premia pushes in ‡ation above the long-run steady-state value. The e¤ect of rising in ‡ation on the intermediary's real net worth partially o¤sets the moderating impact of falling loan demand on the marginal cost of loan creation. This parallels an increase in the cost of borrowing for the producer, which deepens the contraction.
The ease with which prices can be adjusted determines directly the size of the ampli…cation e¤ect associated with price level movements. Our reasoning suggests that, as prices become more ‡exible, increased in ‡ation volatility should exacerbate the ‡uctuations caused by technology shocks. To demonstrate this pattern, Figure 5 displays the impulse responses computed under a smaller value for the price adjustment cost parameter ( = 5). As argued above, the initial expansion as well as the subsequent contraction in output and investment are ampli…ed under increased price ‡exibility relative to the baseline speci…cation.
It is, however, important to note that although balance sheet e¤ects exerted by price level movements amplify the impact of technology shocks, they can dampen the ‡uctuations caused 1 9 This can easily be seen by reexpressing (29) in real terms. Dividing both sides of the equation with Pt we
2 0 Ireland (2004) estimates a New Keynesian model on U.S. data with a pricesetting structure that is identical to ours. His impulse response analysis on the estimated model shows that in ‡ation responds negatively to a positive technology shock. by other types of shocks. The ampli…cation result is driven by the property that a technology shock tends to increase output while placing a downward pressure on prices. The increase in real net worth caused by falling prices improves intermediaries' capacity to originate loans, which reinforces the shock's positive e¤ect on output. However, for certain types of demand shocks that tend to increase output and prices together, balance sheet e¤ects work in the opposite direction.
In the face of these disturbances, rising prices limit the increase in intermediaries'real net worth and constrain their capacity to originate loans, which dampens the shock's positive e¤ect on output.
Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that real business loans lag output in the United States and in the Euro area. Furthermore, strong growth in business credit predicts future decline in output and investment, whereas strong growth in output and investment predicts future growth in business credit. This study shows that …nancial market imperfections can help to explain these cyclical characteristics in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model extended to accommodate frictions in …nancial intermediation. It is argued that, under a reasonable set of parameter values, the interaction of …nancial intermediation and agency costs and the resulting evolution of …nancial intermediary net worth can induce a boom-bust pattern in output, investment and business loans in the model, which can drive the observed cross-correlation structure.
This study can be extended in a number of directions. The studied model does not pinpoint the exact source of …nancial market imperfections that might give rise to variable intermediation costs. Thus, one possible extension involves explicitly accounting for the type of friction that induces variable intermediation costs. Another direction involves evaluating the welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies. As the model already incorporates the elements needed for a meaningful monetary policy discussion, it provides a useful framework to address a number of questions regarding the implications of alternative policy speci…cations in the presence of …nancial market frictions.
Appendix I: Dynamic Correlations
Computation of dynamic correlations involves spectral decomposition of time series into constituent frequency components. Any two covariance-stationary processes x t and y t can be expressed as
where h x (!) and h y (!) are random periodic functions de…ned for a particular frequency ! with
Let s x (!) and s y (!) respectively denote the spectral density functions of x t and y t at frequency !: That is,
. Also, specify a frequency band W = [! 1 ; ! 2 ) where 0
Then, the dynamic correlation between the series x t and y t at the frequency band W is de…ned as to the static correlation between x t and y t after a band-pass …lter that isolates the cycles with frequencies in the band W is applied to both x t and y t .
Appendix II: The Optimal Loan Contract
The optimal contracting problem faced by the typical producer is described by (20) in the text.
After incorporating the de…nition
Pt into the constraint of this problem, the solution can be characterized using a Lagrangian of the form
The …rst order conditions with respect to A t , D t ; and are respectively , (A.2.4) can be rewritten as
which brings us to (21) in the text. Also, dividing both sides of (A.2.3) with P t , we obtain (22) .
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